

◆◆ Chapter 11

Critical Thinking and the Nature of Prejudice

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Abstract

*In this paper, originally prepared as a result of an Anti-Defamation League conference on Critical Thinking and Prejudice, Paul and Adamson argue that there are seven basic flaws in "traditional research into the nature of prejudice". Efforts in prejudice reduction, based on traditional research, tend to merely reshape and redirect prejudice rather than to lessen it. This research problem originated in the failure of theoreticians to take seriously the groundbreaking work of William Graham Sumner in *Folkways* (1906). Sumner developed the view that prejudice is the norm rather than the exception in everyday belief formation. His concept ties in well with Piaget's research into egocentrism and sociocentrism of thought.*

Only a well-conceived critical education, Paul and Adamson argue, "an education that cultivates the rationality of students, ... liberates students from modes of thinking that limit their potential and narrow their perspective" lessens "the natural drive toward prejudice". For Paul and Adamson, "prejudice is a rich, complex, multi-dimensional phenomenon, grounded in ... the primary, instinctual nature of human thinking." Removing it, "requires the development of our secondary, more latent, nature, our capacity to develop as fair-minded, rational persons." Such an emphasis "should not focus on the content of particular prejudices ... but on the mechanisms of prejudice and their role in the struggle for power, advantage, and money." The authors conclude: "A credible program of prejudice reduction ought not focus on the prejudices of others, prejudices against us, for we are ideally situated to change our own mode of thinking, not to change the thinking of others."

◆ *Introduction*

Traditional research into the nature of prejudice has these seven basic flaws: 1) Researchers tend to approach prejudice as an aberration, something abnormal or atypical, something outside the normal mechanisms of thought, desire, and action — in palpable contrast to the main source, direction, and nature of human cognitive and affective life. 2) They tend to emphasize the dysfunctional nature of prejudice, to ignore the many advantages in power, wealth, status, and peace of mind that come from prejudiced states of mind. 3) They tend to focus on negative prejudices, "prejudices-against;" and assume that positive prejudices, "prejudices-for", are independent of negative ones and largely benign. 4) They play down or ignore preju-

dices against belief systems and ideologies, as though prejudices were only against people as such. 5) They fail to emphasize how prejudice is embedded in the pervasive problem of everyday human irrationality. 6) They tend to focus on the content of prejudices, rather than on the mode of thinking generating them. 7) They fail to recognize that significant prejudice reduction requires long-term strategies for developing fair and openminded persons in fair and openminded societies.

We emphasize, in contrast, the normality and universality of prejudice, its "functionality" in advancing the vested interests of favored groups, the harm in positive prejudices, the significance of prejudice against belief systems and ideologies, the embeddedness of prejudice in egocentric minds and sociocentric societies, the mode of thinking that leads to prejudice formation, and the need to focus efforts of prejudice reduction on long-term strategies for fostering openminded persons in openminded societies. We also emphasize the problem of self-serving interest in prejudice reduction: the revulsion we feel when thinking about "their" prejudices against "us;" the apathy we feel when thinking about "our" prejudices against "them".

Few in favor of prejudice reduction focus on their own prejudices, pro or con. Most grossly underestimate the strength and significance of their own prejudices while expressing anger toward and scorn for the prejudices of "others" against them. We argue that prejudice has root causes inherent not only in the human mind but also in traditional human social and cultural arrangements and practices. By largely ignoring the root causes of prejudice, contemporary approaches to prejudice reduction do little except minimize some forms of it while other forms — typically those that further vested interests — thrive. If we do not strike at the roots of prejudice, we do little to lessen the damage and injury it does, though we may shift who is damaged and to what extent.

Prejudices, on this view, are not isolatable things-in-themselves, not mental or affective atoms. Individual prejudices always spring from roots more basic than themselves. Just as a permanent underground stock of a plant continually produces and sustains the stems and leaves, so a deep-seated substratum of beliefs and drives continually creates and sustains prejudices and other irrationalities. Egocentric minds and sociocentric societies are permanent breeding grounds for prejudice. Opposing particular prejudices is pointless unless we take significant steps against what generates them in the first place. Pruning prejudiced plants does not eliminate the plant itself. To date in human history virtually all groups organized for prejudice reduction are organized to reduce particular prejudices, most notably prejudices against them. Rather than being indifferent to prejudices in favor of themselves, they actively cultivate them. Of course they cultivate them under other names such as loyalty, patriotism, or self-defense. Hence, any energy spent on prejudice reduction *reforms* rather than *reduces* prejudice, redirects rather than eradicates it. For these reasons, we argue, both research into prejudice and our conception of prejudice reduction requires a major reorientation.

◆ *The Concept of Prejudice*

The English word “prejudice” derives from the Latin stems *pre* meaning “before” and *judicium* meaning “judgment” or “sentence”. Literally speaking, therefore, it means “judging or sentencing before the evidence has been considered”. Its early recorded uses link it conceptually to injury, detriment, hurt, loss, or damage caused to persons by a judgment or action in which their rights were disregarded.

From the earliest uses one finds the word and its grammatical cognates used with conceptual connections to the affective and the behavioral as well as to the cognitive. Consider the following entries from the *Oxford English Dictionary*:

1. a judgment formed before due examination or consideration; a premature or hasty judgment ...
2. the action of judging an event beforehand
3. preconceived opinion; bias or leaning favorable or unfavorable
4. a feeling, favorable or unfavorable, toward any person or thing, prior to or not based on actual experience; a prepossession; a bias or leaning toward one side; an unreasoning predilection or objection
5. a preconceived idea as to what will happen
6. to affect injuriously or unfavorably by doing some act, or as a consequence of something done
7. to injure materially; to damage

Words with equivalent historical roots exist in French (*préjugé*), German (*Vorurteil*), Portuguese (*preconceito*), and other European languages. Each essentially refers to the human capacity to form prejudgments and preconceptions without adequate reason or before the relevant evidence is in, then to feel and act accordingly to the detriment of others. This core of meaning implies that people can be prejudiced in any dimension of thought, feeling, or action, not only with respect to ethnic or racial groups. Furthermore, the concept of prejudice formation is clearly linked to other basic concepts, such as ‘bias’, ‘subjectivity’, ‘irrationality’, ‘narrowmindedness’, ‘closedmindedness’, ‘oversimplification’, ‘stereotype’, ‘distortion’, ‘rationalization’, ‘self-deception’, ‘egocentricity’, ‘sociocentricity’, ‘ethnocentricity’, ‘fallaciousness’, and so forth. Indeed any sound empirical or theoretical work on why people tend to think, feel, or act in these flawed ways sheds light on the nature or phenomenology of prejudice.

The network of words conceptually intertwined with the word *prejudice* reinforces the seminal nature of prejudice in human life. Prejudice is not likely to become intelligible or treatable as a thing-in-itself. Rather, we should understand it as integral to our understanding of how and why humans, with the raw capacity to form beliefs and feelings upon the basis of adequate reasons and evidence, so often form them otherwise. To put this another way, the question “Why do people often think, feel, and act in a prejudiced way?” is a paraphrase of the question “Why do people often think, feel, and act in a way that does not make sense given the available evidence?” Furthermore,

the tendency of people to be emotionally attached to their prejudices, to hold to them even in the face of overwhelming contrary reasons and evidence, suggests that prejudiced thought and action serve powerful motives or interests. To overturn prejudice we must overturn irrationality, narrowmindedness, self-deception, egocentricity, and sociocentricity. We must understand both the psychological and social functions of prejudiced thought, sentiment, and behavior. And most importantly we must recognize how deep-rooted prejudice is in normal human cognition in every dimension of human life.

◆ *The Status of Research Into Prejudice*

Interestingly, in one of the seminal works in the field of anthropology and sociology, *Folkways* (1906), William Graham Sumner laid a foundation for what could have (but did not) become a global account of the nature of prejudice and a systematic approach to prejudice reduction. His basic thesis was that the overwhelming majority of beliefs and sentiments, both those expressed and those acted upon, are grounded in the folkways and mores of human societies. These foundational bases for belief and sentiment, these sustaining grounds for action and reaction, according to Sumner, are not chosen by people on the basis of reason, evidence, or reflection but rather produced by "frequent repetition of petty acts" which generate "habit in the individual and custom in the group". The principal conditioners of beliefs and sentiments are "pleasure and pain". (Sumner, p. 3)

Sumner implies that prejudgments and preconceptions are inevitable because "the first task of life is to live". "Men begin with acts, not with thoughts." (Sumner, p. 2) For primitive peoples, Sumner notes,

Custom regulates the whole of a man's action, - - his bathing, washing, cutting his hair, eating, drinking, and fasting. From his cradle to his grave he is the slave of ancient usage. (p. 4)

Sumner sees little deviation from this pattern in modern life: "All men act in this way with only a little wider margin of voluntary variation."

People divide people into "ingroups" and "outgroups", forming positive prejudices toward their own group (its beliefs, sentiments, and patterns of behavior) and negative prejudices toward outgroups:

The relation of comradeship and peace in the we-group and that of hostility and war toward others-groups are correlative to each other. The exigencies of war with outsiders are what make peace inside, lest internal discord should weaken the we-group for war. These exigencies also make government and law in the ingroup, in order to prevent quarrels and enforce discipline. Thus war and peace have reacted to each other and developed each other, one within the group, the other in the intergroup relation. (p. 12)

Sumner labels this pattern in human life "ethnocentrism" and argues that it shapes a cast of mind found in virtually all social groups:

Ethnocentrism is the technical name for this view of things in which one's own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it. Each group nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself superior, exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt on outsiders. (p. 13)

Sumner sees patriotism as a common manifestation of ethnocentrism, typically leading to chauvinism:

The masses are always patriotic. For them the old ethnocentric jealousy, vanity, truculency, and ambition are the strongest elements of patriotism. Such sentiments are easily awakened in a crowd. They are sure to be popular. Wider knowledge always proves that they are not based on facts. That we are good and others are bad is never true. Every group of any kind whatsoever demands that each of its members shall help defend group interests. (p. 15)

Again and again Sumner develops the thesis that basic beliefs and sentiments, folkways and mores, wherever found, are grounded in tradition and are not subjected, except in rare circumstances, to rational reflection and critique:

The tradition is its own warrant. It is not held subject to verification by experience. The notion of right is in the folkways. It is not outside of them, of independent origin, and brought to them to test them. In the folkways, whatever is, is right. (p. 28)

Conformity of behavior in society reflects conformity of thought and sentiment:

All are forced to conform, and the folkways dominate social life. Then they seem true and right, and arise into mores as the norm of welfare. Thence are produced faiths, ideas, doctrines, religions, and philosophies, according to the stage of civilization and the fashions of reflection and generalization. (p. 38)

Even the mores of society, its articulated principles of right conduct, rarely reflect or stimulate reasoned belief:

They do not stimulate thought, but quite the contrary. The thinking is already done and is embodied in the mores. They never contain their own amendment. They are not questions, but answers, to the problem of life. They present themselves as final and unchangeable, because they present answers which are offered as "the truth". (p. 79)

Or again:

The trained reason and conscience never have heavier tasks laid upon them than where questions of conformity to, or dissent from, the mores are raised. It is by dissent and free judgment of the best reason and conscience that the mores win flexibility and automatic adjustment. Dissent is always unpopular in the group. (p. 95)

Sumner paints a picture of human life in which prejudiced sentiment and belief, highly resistant to reason and evidence, are pervasive:

The most important fact about the mores is their dominion over the individual. Arising he knows not where or how, they meet his opening mind in earliest childhood, give him his outfit of ideas, faiths, and tastes, and lead him into prescribed mental processes. They bring to him codes of action, standards, and

rules of ethics. They have a model of the man-as-he-should-be to which they mold him, in spite of himself and without his knowledge. (pp. 173-4)

Sumner's personal repugnance toward prejudiced thought and sentiment is given in hundreds of examples that fill the nearly 700 pages of his book. Here is one such example:

The tyranny is greatest in regard to "American" and "Americanism". It follows that if anything is base and bogus it is always labeled "American". If a thing is to be recommended which cannot be justified, it is put under "Americanism". (p. 177)

Sumner, using the concepts of suggestion and pathos, explores the apparatus of social conditioning which universally indoctrinates people and inculcates beliefs and sentiments. He spells out how they are "protected from severe examination", "cherished with such a pre-established preference and faith that it is thought wrong to verify" them, how they work "to preclude verification", and to "create an atmosphere of delusion". (p. 181)

In Sumner's view, and we believe his view is basically sound, belief and sentiment usually are formed precisely as prejudgments and preconceptions. Normally, the basic framework for belief and sentiment is prejudiced. Prejudgment and preconception is the rule, rational assent the exception. As Sumner puts it:

The notion that "the group thinks" deserves to be put to the side of the great freaks of philosophy which have been put forth from age to age. Only the elite in any society, or any age, think, and the world's thinking is carried on by them by the transplanting of ideas from mind to mind, under the stress and strain of clashing argument and tugging debate. If the group thinks, the thought costs nothing, but in truth thought costs beyond everything else (p. 207)

Or again:

... the masses always enforce conformity to the mores. Primitive taboos are absolute. There is no right of private judgment. Renegades, apostates, deserters, rebels, traitors, and heretics are but varieties of dissenters who are subject to disapproval, hatred, banishment, and death. In higher stages of civilization this popular temper becomes a societal force which combines with civil arrangements, religious observances, literature, education, and philosophy. Toleration is no sentiment of the masses for anything which they care about. What they believe they believe, and they want it accepted and respected. (p. 232)

In fact, Sumner titles Chapter 15, "The Mores Can Make Anything Right and Prevent Condemnation of Anything". He closes the chapter with the admonition that the mores of a social group form "a moral and civil atmosphere through which everything ... [is] seen and rational judgment ... made impossible". Only in the exceptional case does Sumner allow for the formation of unprejudiced beliefs:

It is only by high mental discipline that we can be trained to ... form rational judgments on current cases. This mental independence and ethical power are the highest products of education. (p. 532)

Of course, Sumner does not confuse *education* in the sense in which he defends it with mere *schooling*:

School education, unless it is regulated by the best knowledge and good sense, will produce men and women who are all of one pattern, as if turned in a lathe An orthodoxy is produced in regard to all the great doctrines of life. It consists of the most worn and commonplace opinions which are current in the masses. It may be found in newspapers and popular literature. It is intensely provincial and philistine The popular opinions always contain broad fallacies, half-truths, and glib generalizations of fifty years ago. (p. 630–31)

Sumner contrasts typical schooling with genuine education based on the cultivation of critical thought:

Criticism is the examination and test of propositions of any kind which are offered for acceptance, in order to find out whether they correspond to reality or not. The critical faculty is a product of education and training. It is a mental habit and power. It is a prime condition of human welfare that men and women should be trained in it. It is our only guarantee against delusion, deception, superstition, and misapprehension of ourselves and our earthly circumstances Education teaches us to act by judgment. Our education is good just so far as it produces a well developed critical faculty. (p. 632–33)

Sumner also expresses the possibility of a critical society in which the cultivation of the critical faculties would predominate over education for conformity:

The critical habit of thought, if usual in a society, will pervade all its mores, because it is a way of taking up the problems of life. Men educated in it cannot be stampeded They are slow to believe. They can hold things as possible or probable in all degrees, without certainty and without pain. They can wait for evidence and weigh evidence, uninfluenced by the emphasis or confidence with which assertions are made on one side or the other. They can resist appeals to their prejudices and all kinds of cajolery. Education in the critical faculty is the only education of which it can be truly said that it makes good citizens. (p. 633)

Sumner's work, though seminal, is by no means the final word on the subject. Among other things, his book reflects many of his own prejudices. Nevertheless, *Folkways* is unequalled in the literature on prejudice in its scope as a framework for understanding the pervasive social roots of prejudice. Ironically, each of its major theses is missing from the subsequent main stream literature on prejudice:

1. that prejudgment and preconception are the dominant social roots of belief, sentiment, and behavior,
2. that prejudice-for and prejudice-against are intertwined and interdependent,
3. that only a small minority of persons have learned how to critically question their own beliefs and sentiments and to rationally restructure them,
4. that a special education or training is necessary to develop a person's critical faculties, and
5. that a critical society, though possible, has not yet emerged.

Had these theses been taken seriously, subsequent research would have focused on the nature of schooling and socialization. Instead, though the literature is voluminous, the analysis of prejudice has typically been more superficial than Sumner's profound beginnings. After Sumner, prejudgment and preconception are taken as exceptions, prejudice-for played down as innocent and innocuous, the concept of prejudice narrowed to racial and ethnic prejudices, and the bulk of attention focused on socially unpopular prejudices. Consequently, few now recognize the universality of prejudice, its "functionality" in standard social arrangements, or the profound shift needed in schooling for prejudice reduction to be a significant social commitment.

We can document these general tendencies by canvassing the review articles on prejudice in the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* and the *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Psychology*. Otto Klineberg, writing on the concept of prejudice in the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, defines prejudice as "an unsubstantiated prejudgment of an individual or group, favorable or unfavorable in character, tending to action in a consonant direction". Very quickly, however, it becomes clear that Klineberg's is not the broad approach of Sumner. Klineberg moves quickly to the limited view we have been criticizing:

Social science research has joined with popular usage in introducing two limitations to this concept. In the first place, favorable prejudices, although they undoubtedly exist, have attracted relatively little attention, perhaps on the principle that they do good rather than harm. It might, however, legitimately be argued that even favorable prejudices should be discouraged, since they too represent unwarranted generalizations, often of an irrational nature. Second, although prejudice may extend far and wide to apply to objects as disparate as trade-union leaders, women, or exotic foods, in practice it has been considered as dealing primarily, if not exclusively, with populations or ethnic groups distinguished by the possession of specific inherited physical characteristics ("race") or by differences in language, religion, culture, national origin, or any combination of these. (p. 439)

He discounts the universality of prejudice by considering it only as a derivation from psychoanalysis:

One view of the universality of prejudice seems to derive from an erroneous interpretation of psychoanalytic theory. This theory, particularly in its orthodox form, regards hostility or aggression (Freud's Thanatos) as instinctive and universal; prejudice would then be simply one manifestation of this instinct. Not all psychoanalysts would accept this formulation, but even those who would add that although aggression must manifest itself in some form, there is no one form (for example, prejudice) which must be regarded as inevitable. There is still considerable argument as to whether hostile aggression is universal, but in any case it can be expressed in so many different ways that inference to the universality of prejudice remains exceedingly doubtful. (p. 441)

He then focuses the bulk of his article on problems concerning prejudice against minority groups. He makes a passing reference to the ease with which a "healthy" nationalism "moves into an exaggerated chauvinism which

is not only for 'us' but *against* 'them'." He then treats what he calls "economic factors" in which he alludes to the commonly "motivated" nature of prejudice, how it enables

the dominant group to maintain others in a state of subservience, to exploit them, to treat them as slaves or serfs, to reduce their power to compete on equal terms for jobs, and to keep them "in their place". (p. 443)

Quite importantly, he calls attention to the unconscious nature of prejudice and hence to the link of prejudice to self-deception:

They, whom we keep in an inferior position, are happier than they would be otherwise: *they*, whom we persecute because of their beliefs, can be saved only if they accept the true (that is to say, *our*) religion; *they*, whom we destroy, are planning to destroy *us*, and we are simply exercising the right to protect ourselves. It is arguments like these, presented in all sincerity, which so often in the past, and not so rarely in the present, have given to men the conviction that what they are doing is somehow noble and beautiful, in Hooten's telling phrase, they "can rape in righteousness and murder in unanimity". (p. 443)

But he does not follow this up with any link into standard folkways and mores or into the ways they are inculcated. Rather he implies that prejudice is abnormal rather than normal in society:

The fact remains that under the same cultural conditions, surrounded by the same institutions and tempted by the same desire for gain, some people show prejudice and others do not. (p. 443)

He alludes to Adorno's *The Authoritarian Personality* as a possible explanation for this abnormality in development.

The limitations in the research on the nature of prejudice is mirrored in Klineberg's review of the literature on "The Reduction of Prejudice". Far from suggesting that the fundamental cause of prejudice can be found, as Sumner found it, in the inculcative, indoctrinative socialization processes which bypass and diminish a person's capacity for reflective critical thinking, Klineberg favorably mentions the possible use of propaganda techniques to reduce prejudice. He shows no sensitivity to the distinction between schooling based on inculcation and indoctrination on the one hand, and that centered on the cultivation of critical thought on the other. Indeed he ends his article on what he calls an optimistic note by ejaculating,

There is hope, too, in the fact that "authoritarians" are conformist. If prejudice becomes unfashionable, even the hard core of resistance to change may give way to progress.

Henri Tajfel gives a similar account of the literature on prejudice in the *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Psychology*:

1. He says that the term has been narrowed, for these two reasons:

The first is that it is generally applied to people's views about social groups and their members rather than more generally to 'persons' or 'things'.

The second is that, in practice, the term has been mainly restricted in psychological theory and research to hostile or unfavorable views about human groups other than one's own ("outgroups"). It has been used by psychologists in the context of intergroup hostility, conflicts, persecution or discrimination.

2. It focuses on discrimination and hostile attitudes toward minorities, and
3. Although Allport's approach to stereotyping as a general mode of categorizing the social world is briefly discussed, there is no mention of profound implications.

Only by admitting the profound and pervasive nature of prejudiced thought and emotion can we make intelligible the need for profound educational changes to reduce prejudice. A superficial approach to prejudice that views it narrowly, as exceptional rather than routine, cannot be used as the main fulcrum for prejudice reduction.

The best candidate for a follow-up of Sumner's, *Folkways* (1906) is Gordon Allport's *The Nature of Prejudice*. (1954) Like Sumner, Allport approaches prejudice from the broadest of perspectives, attempting to trace prejudice to a variety of roots: "economic exploitation, social structure, the mores, fear, aggression, sex conflict, or any other favored soil". (xvi) However, in attempting to deal with prejudice from a variety of points of view and to point out the limitations of each, the overall effect is diffuse. Furthermore, Allport's work underestimates, as does most of the literature, the significance of positive prejudice: "... we will be concerned chiefly with prejudice *against* ..." (p. 7)

The most significant deficiency of Allport's approach however is his relatively superficial analysis of the nature of the thinking and affect that underlie prejudice. He attempts to account for prejudiced thinking simply as a result of faulty categorization and generalization. Allport sees "irrational categories" as "formed as easily as rational categories". He does not seem to grasp the special difficulties of attempting to cultivate and nurture persons who habitually think rationally. His analysis of rational thinking is too simplistic to help him to realize the need, for example, of profound changes in schooling:

How to combat this irrational overcategorization is a baffling problem

All these obstacles are profoundly serious, representing as they do the most firmly entrenched aspects of irrationalism in people and in social groups.

(Allport, p. 503)

When Allport talks about the role of critical thinking in the solution of the problem of irrationality — and he does so only by implication — his analysis is simplistic:

Fairly early children can ... learn that Foreigner 1 is not the same as Foreigner 2. They can be shown how the law of linguistic precedence in learning (p. 305) creates dangers for them, particularly in the form of derogatory epithets such as "nigger" and "wop". Simple lessons in semantics and in elementary psychology are neither dull nor incomprehensible to children. (Allport, p. 512)

Allport's concluding comment on democracy merely points in the direction of the problem. It is a far cry from Sumner's chapter on the task of developing a critical society:

Democracy, we now realize, places a heavy burden upon the personality, sometimes too great to bear. The maturely democratic person must possess subtle virtues and capacities: an ability to think rationally about causes and effects, an ability to form properly differentiated categories in respect to ethnic groups and their traits, a willingness to award freedom to others, and a capacity to employ it constructively for oneself. All these qualities are difficult to achieve and maintain. It is easier to succumb to oversimplification and dogmatism, to repudiate the ambiguities inherent in a democratic society, to demand definiteness, to "escape from freedom". (Allport, p. 515)

◆ *Curriculum Materials Focusing on Prejudice Reduction*

Curriculum materials reflect the deficiencies in the research on prejudice. Of the curriculum materials on prejudice we reviewed, one of the best is Book 2 of the series "Challenges of Our Time" entitled *Prejudice and Discrimination*. Its quality notwithstanding, this book reflects the same basic oversimplifications detailed above.

The book contains six chapters, an introduction, and a conclusion. Five of the six chapters address racial or cultural prejudice, the sixth, sexual prejudice. The aim and direction of the book is given in the Forward to the teacher's guide.

Prejudice and Discrimination deals with the problems arising from the social (group-forming) nature of human beings. The prejudices, competition, and conflicts that arise between groups are discussed in terms of ethnic, sexual, racial, and religious discrimination and adjustment. Special emphasis is given to the pluralistic quality of American society: a general discussion of the theme of "a nation of immigrants" is followed by an examination of the specific situations of various ethnic minorities in the United States, including Jews, indigenous Americans (Indians), Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, Chinese Americans, Japanese Americans, and Afro-Americans. One chapter is devoted to anti-Semitism and Nazi persecution of the Jews and another to sexual prejudice in American society. (p. 2)

The book primarily focuses on racial prejudice. It barely touches on other forms of prejudice. It ignores the harm done by national, ideological, professional, personal, and religious prejudice. The chapter entitled "The Jewish People" might have led to a discussion of religious prejudice, but does not. Instead, when addressing the Jewish religion it concerns itself only with prejudice against the Jews culturally. It fails to address ideological prejudice anywhere, except by implication. Thus the authors not only miss the opportunity to analyze prejudice for and against political, economic, philosophical, and social systems, they also fail to address the roots of prejudice: the ego-centric/sociocentric mind.

When they do hint at ideological prejudice, they ignore the ideational dimension. The term "Americanization" is introduced in chapter two, "The United States: A Nation of Immigrants", and refers to the pressure felt by immigrants to adopt the values and attitudes held by most Americans. Two questions might be asked: "To what extent was this a prejudice against other ways of seeing and understanding the world?" and, "To what extent was it a demand that all Americans learn to think alike, to share the same assumptions, the same ideas, the same world view?" The book neglects these questions. The lesson ignores how the history of U.S. prejudice involves significant prejudice against foreign *ideas* and *beliefs*, not just against foreign customs and dress, or ethnicity.

The Forward contains a list of 56 objectives for the series "Challenges of Our Time". The volume *Prejudice and Discrimination* includes the following paraphrased objectives: Students will be able to recognize various views of human nature: humans as rational and good, irrational and bad, mixture of both, the anarchist view, the racist view; students will understand the meaning of culture; students will understand the concept of groups and the basic psychological feature of group relations (in-group/out-group, or we-they attitudes.)

The few objectives cited here are quite significant, and, if ambitiously pursued, could lead students to useful and important insights into the nature of prejudiced thought, as well as into the nature of thought in general, for prejudice is grounded in the very way beliefs are formed. However, the book takes a less than ambitious approach and leaves untouched the heart of prejudice. For it is not enough to discover that one has this or that prejudice; one must also discover how one generates and multiplies prejudices in an ongoing way. One cannot kill poison oak merely by periodically picking a leaf off the plant. Prejudice producing modes of thinking *must* become the focus of instruction for prejudice reduction. The content of the prejudices is secondary; it does not much matter what particular prejudices particular humans have. It is their profound involvement in "prejudgment" as a habitual mode of thinking and judgment that is the key problem. Only by exposing and examining the roots of prejudice can we effectively begin to eliminate it.

This failure to recognize prejudice formation as a mode of thought is continued in the book's treatment of positive prejudice. In the student text, positive prejudice is defined as: "A preference for certain ideas, values, things, or people". (p. 5) These preferences, the student is told, are not necessarily harmful or unhealthy, and may be required to be loyal to one's group. Quoting again from the student text:

If one is a member of a group one will usually have a prejudice in favor of it, that is, a preference for it. One will be prejudiced in favor of the group's values. If these values are sound, one's prejudice will probably be sound, too. A prejudice in favor of one's children or one's parents is a good thing in a family. (p. 5)

By approving of positive prejudice, the book potentially undermines all it attempts to accomplish. A positive prejudice is typically accompanied by a negative prejudice, for in being prejudiced in favor of particular groups we more or less automatically oppose those groups in conflict with them. In this sense, positive prejudice is rarely, if ever, harmless. Others are typically affected by our prejudices. This is certainly true of national prejudice. Our prejudice in favor of our nation tends to be accompanied by a prejudice against those nations that differ from or oppose our own. This affects our attitudes toward these nations, and our policies concerning them. We usually develop double standards to protect these prejudices, judging the actions and policies of our country differently than the actions and policies of opposing countries. Our positive prejudice may lead us to think any who say we have wronged them are either liars or fools.

Prejudice, as we have said, is located in a general mode of thinking by which beliefs are formed and maintained. Until we learn to form beliefs on the basis of rational considerations, we form them without such consideration — that is, as prejudices. Approving of positive prejudice encourages this prejudice forming process, as though it could be limited to innocent prejudices. Furthermore, in the confusion, rational preference is obscured.

To rationally prefer some belief implies that we have strong reasons and evidence to support it, and conversely, good reason to oppose conflicting beliefs. It also of course requires us to consider the case against our preferences or against the way we manifest our preference in action. *Blind* loyalty to a group is not, for example, a rational preference. Neither is the practice of giving preferred status in a society to particular ethnic and religious groups. A prejudiced preference, on the other hand, implies a preference based not on good reasons, but on considerations that will not stand up to critical assessment. Unknowingly, it is this prejudiced preference which the lesson encourages. Egocentricity and sociocentricity generate positive and negative prejudices as part of egocentric and sociocentric activities of mind, and it is these fundamental drives that must be overcome to make any significant progress toward prejudice reduction. We cannot work against prejudice if we encourage the very processes that create it.

To sum up, although this book introduces the student to some important concepts and tendencies, it is on the whole superficial, and contains fundamental confusions. Inadvertently, the book reflects the narrow focus of contemporary research on prejudice reduction.

◆ *Prejudice and Human Desire*

Human action arises from human motives and human motives arise from human desire and perceived interest. Getting what we want and what advances our prestige, wealth, power, and peace of mind naturally structures and shapes how we conceive of and understand the situations and circum-

stances of our daily lives. We categorize, make assumptions, interpret, and infer from within a viewpoint we routinely use to advance our personal ends and desires. We are, in a word, naturally prejudiced in our favor. We reflexively and spontaneously gravitate to the slant on things that makes it easiest to gratify our desires and justify doing so, including the desire to be correct. We naturally shrink at the thought of being wrong, and conversely, delight in the thought of being right, and so often resist the attempts of others to "correct" us, especially when this involves beliefs that are fundamental and part of our personal identity.

The thinking, then, most natural or instinctive in humans Freud called "pleasure-principle thinking". This mode of thinking requires the absence of intellectual virtues, for the presence of these virtues would prevent us from thinking one-sidedly in ways that structure or shape situations to our advantage. "How-can-I-think-of-this-situation-in-such-a-way-as-to-get-what-I-want-out-of-it?" is a reflex in the thinking of humans. Consider these two examples.

A small child who wanted to play her audio tape for a guest was told by the guest to first ask her mother if that was all right. The child ran to her mother and said, "She wants to hear my tape!" She instinctively knew not to say, "I want to play my tape. Could I play it for her?"

A toddler who was told by his mother that he could not play outside because it was raining, looked thoughtfully out the window and then ejaculated: "Yes, I can play outside. It isn't raining, its only drizzling!" Already these children are learning to structure their requests and interpret evidence in ways that help them get their way.

The extent to which these perceived interests and the means adopted to realize them are unexamined is the extent to which these ends and means are prejudices. We begin with self-serving assumptions, and from these assumptions proceed to build a system of beliefs. This system may be quite complex and sophisticated, but if the assumptions upon which it rests are a result of prejudgments, the beliefs built on them are prejudices. 'Prejudice', then, refers to the manner in which the belief is formed and held, not to its falsity. A prejudice is not necessarily a false belief, and may, on examination, be rationally defensible. Prior to this examination however it is no less a prejudice.

◆ *Prejudice and the Illusion of Morality*

To be prejudiced in favor of our perceived interests entails that we become prejudiced against whomever or whatever appears to oppose or stand in the way of furthering them. It is not enough to be taught to be honest, kind, generous, thoughtful, concerned with others, and respectful of human rights. The human mind can easily construe situations in ways that conceive selfish desire as self-defense, cruelty as discipline, domination as love, intolerance

as conviction, and in general, evil as good. The mere conscious desire to do good does not remove prejudiced conceptions which shape perceptions to further our interests or keep us from forming such conceptions. To minimize our egocentric drives, we must develop critical thinking in a special direction. We need not only intellectual *skills* but intellectual *character* as well. Indeed, we must develop and refine our intellectual skills as we develop and refine our intellectual character, to embed the skills in our character and shape our character through the skills.

Much of our thinking is directed at deciding to perform some action from among a range of possible actions. Whatever action we decide to take will inevitably influence others in some way, often trivially, sometimes profoundly. There is, then, a distinctly moral dimension to thinking that must not be ignored. People not only *can*, but often *do* create the illusion of morality in a variety of ways. One major way is the systematic confusion of group mores with universal moral standards.

When people act in accordance with the injunctions and taboos of the group to which they belong they naturally feel righteous. They receive much praise in moral terms, and may even be treated as moral leaders, if they speak or act in a way that impresses the group. For this reason, few people distinguish moral or religious conformity or demagoguery from genuine moral integrity. Group norms are typically articulated in the language of morality and a socialized person inwardly experiences some sense of shame or guilt in violating a social taboo, and anger or moral outrage at others who do so. In other words, what commonly seems to be the inner voice of conscience is often nothing more than the internalized voice of social authority, the voice of our parents, our teachers, and other "superiors" speaking within us. Genuine moral integrity requires what might be called "intellectual character" and this requires rational assent, for moral decisions require thoughtful discrimination between what is merely socially permitted and what is genuinely morally justified.

The other major way in which humans systematically create the illusion of morality is egocentrically structured self-deception. This, as we have mentioned, is the shaping and justification of self-serving perceptions and viewpoints. When engaged in such spontaneous thought, we systematically confuse our viewpoint with reality itself. We do not experience ourselves as selecting among a range of possible perceptions; quite the contrary, it seems to us that we simply observe things *as they are*. What is really egocentric intellectual arrogance we experience as righteous moral judgment. This leads us to conceive those who disagree with us as fools, dissemblers, or worse. Since our inner voice tells us that our motives are pure, that we see things as they really are, those who set themselves against us or threaten to impede us often seem the manifestation of evil. If they use violence to advance their ends, we experience their action as aggressive, as blind to human rights and simple justice. But if we use violence, it is not even conceived as violence but as justifiable self-defense, as the restoring of law and

order, as the protection of right and justice. We habitually use double standards to assess the beliefs and actions of ourselves and others. The one we apply to ourselves is sympathetic, open-ended, and forgiving, the one we apply to others is unsympathetic, rigid, and unforgiving.

◆ *Prejudiced in Favor of Our Interests*

Consider the common sense truth that human groups typically have vested interests and spend a significant part of their time and energy advancing them. Developing a point of view, a framework of beliefs that serve these interests, is crucial to "success". The result is that prejudiced thinking is usually functional. Fairminded thinking impedes success by diffusing effort and nurturing self-restraint that limits "profit" and "advantage". This basic truth lies at the root of much worldly prejudice. One finds it in all special interest groups, whether professional, economic, religious, ethnic, or otherwise. This can be illustrated by a recent segment of the history of the American Medical Association.

A professional association like the AMA routinely pursues the perceived vested interests of its members. This pursuit is part and parcel of developing a frame of reference and mode of thinking prejudiced in favor of these interests. For example, because the approach of the AMA to health care is predominantly pharmacological and surgical, we can predict that members will be unsympathetic to such things as home birth, holistic medicine, and chiropractic. Also, since the approach to medical practice is committed to a particular conception of free enterprise and private practice, we can be confident that the AMA will reject socialized medicine. Since the profession is based on perceived interests, on pharmacology and surgery, and on a conception of free enterprise and private practice, members of the AMA generally oppose positions that appear to negate or question views favoring these positions. They also fail to grant that there may be elements of significant truth in these opposing positions.

Consequently, few doctors read books which advocate an opposing position, such as socialized medicine or chiropractic. Thus, few doctors hear or understand the strongest arguments against the dominant thinking within their profession. They think this unnecessary because they are confident in their positions *a priori*, before the evidence. In other words, they are prejudiced in favor of views into which they were socialized by the culture of medical school and medical practice.

Consider, as an illustration, the AMA's position on chiropractic therapy. Prior to the early 1970's, some advocates of chiropractic made exaggerated claims regarding the types of disorders it could effectively treat — citing as treatable, cancer, high blood pressure, diabetes, and infectious disease. This provided a reasonable ground for AMA skepticism regarding chiropractic. However, this legitimate AMA concern for patient care soon escalated into a general caricature of chiropractic. So powerful was this negative prejudice

that the AMA conspired against the chiropractic profession. It took a court ordered permanent injunction to restrain the AMA (*Chester A. Wilks vs. American Medical Association*). On August 27, 1987, the United States District Court decided in this case that, "the AMA and its members participated in a conspiracy against chiropractors in violation of the nation's antitrust laws". (*JAMA*, p. 81) According to the Permanent Injunction Order:

In the early 1960's, the AMA decided to contain and eliminate chiropractic as a profession. In 1963 the AMA's Committee on Quackery was formed. The committee worked aggressively, both overtly and covertly, to eliminate chiropractic. One of the principle means used by the AMA to achieve its goal was to make it unethical for medical physicians to professionally associate with chiropractors. (*JAMA*, p. 81)

In the early 1970's, chiropractic therapy began to change, and claims of its effectiveness became more reasonable. The AMA, however, did not begin to alter its position toward chiropractic until 1977, after several lawsuits had been brought against the AMA a year earlier. Although policy had now "officially" changed, this new policy was not passed on to the members of the AMA. Quoting again from the Permanent Injunction Order:

The AMA's present position on chiropractic, as stated to this court, is that it is ethical for a medical physician to professionally associate with chiropractors provided the physician believes that such association is in the best interests of his patients. This position has not previously been communicated by the AMA to its members. (*JAMA*, p. 81)

An initially legitimate concern for patient health became a prejudice. Of course, the initial concern may have also included a desire on the part of the AMA to "protect its turf". In the case of *Wilks vs. the AMA*,

The court concluded that the AMA had a genuine concern for scientific methods in patient care, and that this concern was the dominant factor in motivating the AMA's conduct. However, the AMA failed to establish that throughout the entire period of the boycott, from 1966 to 1980, this concern was objectively reasonable Finally, the court ruled that the AMA's concern for scientific method in patient care could have been adequately satisfied in a manner less restrictive of competition and that a nationwide conspiracy to eliminate a licensed profession was not justified by the concern for scientific method. On the basis of these findings, the court concluded that the AMA had failed to establish the patient care defense. (*JAMA*, p. 82)

Even though "AMA witnesses, including the present Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the AMA, testified that some forms of treatment by chiropractors, including manipulation, can be therapeutic in the treatment of conditions such as back pain syndrome" (*JAMA*, p. 82), this prejudice against chiropractic persists among physicians today. Few physicians know about instances in which chiropractic manipulation of the joints and spine are, or can be, therapeutic. Few advise their patients to seek chiropractic care, and many even attempt to dissuade from visiting chiropractors those patients who express a desire to do so.

This is merely one illustration out of a virtually endless series of examples of professional prejudice. In addition to professional prejudice, of course, there are many other forms of prejudice: personal, cultural, religious, ideological, social, scientific, and national. Each, if analyzed, yields parallel insights. Later we will look at national prejudice.

The central problem of prejudice reduction in the world is that *self-announced prejudice almost never exists*. Prejudice nearly always exists in obscured, rationalized, socially validated, functional forms. It enables people to sleep peacefully at night even while flagrantly abusing the rights of others. It enables people to get more of what they want, or get it more easily. It is often sanctioned with pomp and ceremony. It sometimes appears as the very will of God. Unless we admit to these powerful tendencies in ourselves, in our social institutions, in what we sometimes take to be our most lofty actions, we will not face the problem of prejudice realistically. We will fail to attack it at its roots. We will avoid taking those measures which could empower our children to move in the direction of genuine fairmindedness. It is not mere coincidence that most groups concerned with prejudice concern themselves with the prejudices of *others*. Only on the rarest of occasions do groups focus any attention on their own prejudices for or against others.

◆ *Taking Prejudice Reduction Seriously: The Role of Education*

Whether in or out of school, the dominant mode of social learning is didactic, dogmatic, fragmented, and un conducive to independent critical thought. The belief that knowledge can be directly transmitted by simple statement and memorization is so embedded in the public and academic mind that instruction in this mode is a virtual addiction. Part of the reason for this is that schooling became a large scale social commitment at the turn of the century so that people might have the basic skills to fill the nation's need for manufacturing, not that people might become autonomous critical thinkers. (Tucker, 1980) The very design of schools of the day reflected that of factories. (Keating and Oakes, 1988) But the roots of the didactic paradigm of knowledge and learning long pre-dates the turn of the century.

For thousands of years most children in most societies were expected to do what their parents did, and what their parents did was essentially what their parents and their parent's parents had done for many generations. Today, parents, peer groups, mass media, and teachers transmit beliefs with little sensitivity to or explicit awareness of what it would be to give good reasons and evidence to support those beliefs.

Didacticism, the direct transmission of beliefs taken to be true, is accepted as the transmission of knowledge itself, and rote recall accepted as proof of knowledge acquisition. At all levels of schooling the main mode of instruction is didactic lecturing and the main mode of learning is reiterating what is said

or written. Students memorize information and facts, but rarely think critically about what they take in, since this is not required to pass the tests. Students do not connect what they learn in school to their experience outside of school. Nor do they make interdisciplinary connections, as, for example, between what they learn in history and what they learn in civics. Since this type of instruction requires little or no critical thinking, uncritical modes of thought are undisturbed, and the modes of thought conducive to prejudice formation flourish, not only undiminished, but accelerated.

In short, the mere reiteration of facts and formulas should not be confused with assimilation of knowledge. When knowledge is separated from thinking and presented as a thing in itself, it ceases to be knowledge. One need not think about or understand what one memorizes in order to memorize it. Knowledge, on the other hand, cannot be separated from thinking minds. Knowledge is produced by thinking, grasped by thinking, transformed by thinking, and assessed by thinking. We gain genuine knowledge through disciplined dialogue, through critically analyzed experience, through controlled experiment, through careful consideration of divergent points of view, through the critical examination of assumptions, implications, and consequences, through a sensitivity to contradiction and inconsistency, and through carefully developed reasoning. To work toward these ends entails a large scale educational commitment, one largely absent from contemporary educational theory and practice.

◆ *Two Modes of Thinking and Learning*

There are two basic modes of learning: association and logic. The first is unmediated, spontaneous, and automatic; the second mediated, thoughtful, and deliberate. Understanding the fundamental differences between them sheds further light on the nature of education and the generation of prejudices.

ASSOCIATIONAL THINKING AND LEARNING

What we find together in our experience we associate in our minds. If we are frequently punished for not eating our spinach we associate spinach with punishment. If it often rains in the summer, we associate rain with summer. If our parents generally speak of African-Americans disparagingly, we associate negativity with African-American persons. When entertainment media portray scientists as socially dysfunctional, carpenters as ignorant, blondes as flaky, we associate those groups with those characteristics. This is the lowest and simplest kind of learning. It is effortless and automatic. However it is often unjustified. (What is "connected" in our experience might well be unconnected in fact; what was "separate" in our experience might well be connected.)

When we subconsciously and mindlessly accept our associations as the truth (What do you associate with 'blond topless waitress' or 'communist sympathizer?'), we uncritically accept what are typically stereotypes and

prejudices. Mere association is in fact a classic basis for prejudgment. We do not then figure out for ourselves what underlies our conclusions, we do not then typically recognize that we are coming to conclusions at all. Our associations seem to us bare facts.

Of course, many of our associations are transitory connections that we quickly forget, precisely because we have not figured them out for ourselves. These flit in and out of our minds. As such they are not a significant problem for the mind. But others are. Others are repeated thousands of times and become deeply rooted in our subconscious thought, laying the foundation for hundreds of prejudices, pro and con. Peer group indoctrination is of this later sort.

The only way to use associative learning as a basis for genuine knowledge is to go beyond it to logic. We use logic when we figure out whether our associations have a basis in reason or fact: Does the association make sense? Do we have evidence or reasons to support it? Does it fit in with other things we know? For example, by studying climate we could come to recognize that there is no necessary relationship between rain and summer. By studying human nature and paying closer attention to the African-American persons we meet, we can break down our prejudiced association of African-Americans with negativity. And by reflecting on spinach and punishment, we can readily see there is no objective relationship between them. We can figure out why the connections we had formed through mere association do or do not make sense, do or do not stand to reason, are or are not based on sound inferences.

CRITICAL THINKING AND THE LOGIC OF THOUGHT

The word 'critical' comes from the root 'skeri': to cut, take apart, or analyze; and from the Greek word 'kriterion': a standard for judging. The word 'logic' comes from the Greek word 'logos': word, speech, account, thought, reckoning. When we think critically we do not thoughtlessly accept things as we find them. We use our power of thought to take things apart, to analyze them; we use our power of language, logos, to account for things. We set up standards for judgment and use them to give things a conscious reckoning. We do this to genuinely understand what we experience, to go beyond mere association.

When we analyze the logic of things, rather than blindly associate them, we raise our learning to a higher order through critical thought. We begin the process of developing our capacity for rational assent. We begin to develop standards for belief. We begin to question what we read, what we hear and what we subconsciously infer. We forge logical rather than simply associative connections. We often say to ourselves: "Let me see, does that make sense?" Then we talk our way through inferences, reminding ourselves of the key things we know as we proceed. Sometimes we devise an experiment or test of some kind or ask others for their thinking, which we then analyze and consider.

Much school learning relies on association rather than logic. In the rush to cover content, we give students conclusions and constructions that someone else developed. Students retreat to association to achieve recall. They rarely use their own logical powers to reflect on what is taught to them to deter-

mine whether they can make sense of it. They rarely form standards of judgment or give a personal reckoning to the conclusions they are didactically taught. They seldom take apart what is presented as connected or put together what is presented as separate. They do not therefore typically determine whether these connections make good sense to them, whether their own thought justifies them. The result is that they often mis-learn, they often forget, they often confuse, they rarely effectively use, what they learn.

Most students' work reflects associations formed about school in general or about particular subjects or assignments. These associations usually minimize higher order learning, for they represent mind-sets contrary to independent logical thought. Students do not learn to think in critically reflective and fairminded ways precisely because it is not taught, encouraged, or modeled in their instruction.

In other words, students do not expect to have to think for themselves while in school. They associate school with passivity, with someone else telling them things to remember for tests. In history classes they expect to be given names, dates, events, and their results. Fair game is asking them to repeat them. In math classes they expect to be given formulas to use according to fixed procedures. Fair game is giving them problems that can be solved by routine use of the formulas covered immediately before the test.

English classes have several operative associations. If asked to read a story students expect to be asked to recall randomly selected details or to give their subjective reactions. They do not expect to have to distill the plot, figure out the meaning of a story, or back up their subjective reactions with evidence from it. They expect the teacher ultimately to let them know the "real" meaning of the story and what if anything they should remember for the test. They expect to be given lists of words and sentences to "do" according to directions. ("Underline each noun.") If asked to write they expect either to repeat what the text or the teacher said, to copy the encyclopedia, or to write out their subjective impressions and associations as these occur to them. They have only a foggy notion of what it means to think logically. They have no sense of how to develop an idea logically. They do not realize that their thought depends on assumptions that they might probe or examine. They do not recognize that their interpretations represent inferences. They do not know how to marshal evidence for their conclusions. They do not know how to check their thinking or that of others for contradictions. They do not see that their thinking, like all thinking, takes place within a point of view or frame of reference. One might say that they are critically illiterate. The associational and impressionistic dominate their thought. Rather than form the foundation for modes of learning and thinking which undermine prejudices, the mode of instruction in schools typically fosters prejudgment and stereotypes.

◆ *A Critical Education*

An education that cultivates the rationality of students is a significant challenge. A critical education provides the tools and skills necessary for independent thinking and learning. It liberates students from modes of thinking that limit their potential and narrow their perspective. It appeals to reason and evidence. It encourages students to discover as well as to process information. It stimulates students to use their own thinking to come to conclusions and solutions, to defend positions on issues, to consider a wide variety of points of view, to analyze concepts, theories, and explanations, to clarify issues and conclusions, to evaluate the credibility of sources, to raise and pursue root questions, to solve non-routine problems, to transfer ideas to new contexts, to make interdisciplinary connections, to evaluate arguments, interpretations, and beliefs, to generate novel ideas, to question and discuss each others' views, to compare perspectives and theories, to compare ideals with actual practice, to examine assumptions, to distinguish relevant from irrelevant facts, to explore implications and consequences, and to come to terms with contradictions and inconsistencies. Only such a pervasive shift in instruction and school climate will get at the roots of student thinking.

A shift in classroom procedure from a didactic mode to a dialogical mode of teaching, where student questions, objections, and opinions can be freely and comfortably expressed, will of course take time, as teachers will need to learn new strategies, a new conception of knowledge and learning, and new habits of classroom response.

GETTING INTO THE LOGIC OF WHAT WE LEARN

Getting into the habit of reflecting upon the logic of what one learns is key to critical thought. Not only does this require figuring things out for oneself, it also requires pursuing the roots of what one learns until one establishes logical foundations for it. This involves tying any given thing learned into a basic logic one already understands. For example, to study history, the critical thinker does not simply memorize names, events, and dates, or thoughtlessly accept statements regarding causes and results. Nor is it enough to reflect upon alternative historical explanations. One must also reflect upon the very logic of historical thought itself: What is it to think historically? To what extent is historical thinking a dimension of all of our thinking about the world? To what extent, in other words, is all human thinking historical? This reflection need not be esoteric and distracting. The key is to recognize that everything we learn is temporally sequenced, that we continually see the present in light of how we have come to see the past, and that each of us has internalized a selective memory of what has happened to us, emphasizing what seemed to us to be significant in our experience.

When we grasp that all humans shape their present by their reading of their past and their anticipation of the future in the light of the past, we are ready to come to terms with the logic of history. We then approach not

only all historical texts but all interpretation of experience with the awareness that all recording or interpreting of the past is selective, presupposes value judgments about what is important, and organizes what is recorded within one out of a number of rationally defensible frames of reference or points of view. The best basis for reasoning well within a domain of human learning or experience is to figure out how the basic elements of thought interrelate within that domain.

ETHICAL REASONING AND PREJUDICE

Consider the ethical domain as an example. Prejudiced thought is often unethical, or rationalizes unethical behavior. But how are we to understand the basic logic of moral reasoning? How are we to understand the ingredients or elements of thought at work in everyday moral thought? We can distinguish at least these three elements:

1) *General principles of morality*, such as "Do not cheat, deceive, exploit, harm, or steal from others," "Respect the rights of others, including their freedom and well-being," "Help those most in need of help, seek the common good, and strive to make the world more just and humane." These tend to be shared by people everywhere, at least as expressed ideals.

2) *Conflicting general perspectives of the world*, such as conservatism, liberalism, theism, atheism, mainstream U.S., Soviet, Chinese, or Japanese world views. These tend to determine how people conceptualize moral situations.

3) *Data, information, or facts relevant to a particular moral issue*. Our particular moral judgments are ultimately judgments about particular situations, actions, or persons. We come to our conclusions, at least in part, on the basis of what we take to be "the facts of the case". (Paul, 1988b)

To reason more critically about moral issues, we must reason with full cognizance of these elements, be able to distinguish the general moral principles advanced, the perspective on the world into which those principles are integrated, and the factual allegations presupposed or expressed. Quite commonly, for example, people disagree in their general perspective on the world. One is conservative, the other liberal; one approaches the issue from a mainstream French point of view, the other from a Chinese. Awareness of these elements does not guarantee resolution of a moral issue, but it does enable reasoners to focus more particularly on possible problem areas, and, most importantly, gain insight into how and why their own reasoning may be biased. For example, our personal, professional, or national perspective on the world is often based on conditioned associations which have, over time, become uncritically held prejudgments. As thinkers who aspire to fairmindedness we often have to probe the assumptions that underlie our reasoning; often we find no rational foundation for them.

◆ *Traits of Mind and Modes of Learning*

The traits of mind and character we develop reflect our use of both logic and association. It makes a profound difference if and how we foster the mind's capacity for rational thought. People easily use their logical powers to justify prejudice, narrowmindedness, and intellectual arrogance. When we are prejudiced, we typically reason logically from prejudiced premises to prejudiced conclusions. Our inferences are logically flawless; these are not the problem. It is the deep seated starting points of our reasoning that are flawed.

We can see this most readily in others. Hence, when the Soviet government sent troops into Afghanistan, they had no trouble justifying their involvement logically. They reasoned as follows:

When a government that represents the interests of the people is threatened by subversion from outside capitalist forces, it is the moral responsibility of the Soviet Union to stand by their side to protect them until they can successfully defend themselves. The government of Afghanistan represents the interests of the people and is threatened by subversion by the CIA. *Therefore*, it is the moral responsibility of the Soviet Union to protect them.

We easily see the questionableness of the assumption that the government of Afghanistan represents the interests of the people precisely because we do not share it. We are amazed that the Soviets can be so blinded by their prejudices. What we fail to see, of course, is that we are blinded by our own assumptions, which do not seem to us to be prejudices. They seem rather self-evident truths. We, for example, assume that when the CIA intervenes to overturn a government, it does so to serve the interests of its people.

To find the roots of the problem we need only review the contrary social conditioning and accompanying associations of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. U.S. citizens are conditioned to associate the United States with these images and ideas: the stars and stripes, George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, the Bill of Rights, freedom, democracy, land of opportunity, justice for all, human rights, leader of the free world, U.S. military, defense of the free world, etc. Soviets, in turn, are conditioned to associate the USSR with these images and ideas: hammer and sickle, Karl Marx, Lenin, freedom, people's democracy, land of the people, classless society, justice for all, freedom from want and exploitation, defender of the world's poor and workers, great hope for humanity and socialism, etc. The network of conditioned associations operate implicitly to generate a virtually unending series of prejudiced conclusions on both sides. Each side is prejudiced by its own positive associations with itself. Of course this is not all, since both countries also have negative associations about the other.

U.S. citizens associate the Soviet Union with bread-lines, cold and calculating bureaucrats, a monolithic power structure, slavery, totalitarianism, a drive to conquer the world for communism, Siberian labor camps, inefficiency, unhappy people, grey buildings, drab clothes, and long suffering. Soviets, in

turn, associate the United States with the wealthy dominating the poor, massive slums, malnourished poor, drug dealers, prostitutes, gangsters, racism, pornography, right-wing leadership, political corruption, greed, and a ruling-class drive to prevent the workers of the world from self-determination.

Neither side questions its own associations and the prejudices these associations spawn. Each side uses all of its logical powers to trick or outmaneuver the other. Each is self-righteous in its thought and action. Neither side is intellectually humble. Neither side is fairminded. All this is done in a spirit of confident sincerity, with neither side believing itself to have committed any breach of intellectual integrity.

As long as individuals or groups refuse to recognize the conditioned associations that operate at the base of their thinking they cannot develop the traits of mind and character necessary for a significant transcendence of prejudice. Their logical skills will mainly be used to *maintain* rather than to *critique* their prejudices. Their thinking will remain primarily associational and impressionistic, easily influenced by desire, egocentricity, and sociocentricity, typically self-serving, resistant to criticism, and characterized by a lack of intellectual and moral character.

The contrasting mode of thinking is, in a sense, unnatural, and requires a sustained effort to develop. It is primarily logical and driven by a commitment to a consistent and fair use of logical principles. The drive for integrity in thought is characterized by the intellectual virtues: intellectual humility, perseverance, courage, fairmindedness, integrity, and confidence in reason. The challenge, then, is this: to encourage a shift from an egocentric, prejudice forming mode of thinking to a critically reflective and fairminded one.

TEACHING FOR INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE

Such a shift in thinking requires that students *learn intellectual skills* as they *develop traits of mind*. These perfections of mind are acquired if students progressively recognize the importance and value of these virtues as they think in ways consonant with them. Modes of thinking and educational practices are, then, inseparable. Students cannot develop intellectual skills incompatible with classroom practice. Nor can students be expected to develop intellectual traits if these traits are not modeled in an environment favorable to their development.

Nevertheless, there are specific ways in which each of the intellectual virtues can be cultivated and encouraged. *Intellectual fairmindedness* can be fostered by encouraging students to consider evidence and reasons for positions they disagree with, as well as those with which they agree. Students can also be encouraged to show reciprocity when disputes arise or when the class is discussing issues, evaluating the reasoning of story characters, or discussing other cultures. *Intellectual humility* can be fostered in any situation in which students are not in a position to know, by encouraging them to explore the basis for their beliefs. Teachers can model intellectual humility by demonstrating a willingness to admit limits in their own knowledge and

in human knowledge generally. *Intellectual courage* is fostered through a consistently openminded atmosphere. Students should be encouraged to honestly consider or doubt any belief. Students who disagree with their peers or text should be given support. Probing questions could be asked regarding unpopular ideas which students have hitherto been discouraged from considering. *Intellectual good faith* or *integrity* can be modeled and fostered by teachers' being sensitive to their own inconsistencies in the application of rules or standards, and helping students to explore their own. When evaluating or developing criteria for evaluation, students should assess both themselves and others, noting their tendency to favor themselves. *Intellectual perseverance* can be fostered by going back to previous problems to reconsider or re-analyze them, as opportunity presents itself. By reviewing and discussing the kinds of difficulties that were inherent in previous problems worked on, and exploring why it is necessary to struggle with them over an extended period, students come to see the value in pursuing important ideas at length. *Confidence in reason* can be fostered by giving students multiple opportunities to try to persuade others and by encouraging students who disagree to reason with one another. These are a few of the many ways in which the traits of mind that define intellectual virtues can be fostered.

◆ *National Prejudice*

It was stated at the beginning of this paper that there are seven fundamental deficiencies in current research on prejudice. In this and the following section we exemplify how each of these seven areas are more common than is admitted. National prejudice will be used as an illustration.

The natural drive toward prejudice is grounded, as we have argued, in egocentricity and its social extension, sociocentricity. We often make ourselves, our group, and our nation the standard by which others are compared and judged, and we do this typically on the basis of prejudgments. We do not, for example, experience a wide variety of societies and then make a comparative judgment based on independent standards. Rarely do we learn to think within the frame of reference of any group or society other than our own. Rather we begin with a host of prejudgments that we and ours are best, and then interpret and experience the events of our world upon the basis of these prejudgments. Not only our thinking but our very identity becomes shaped by thought and experience grounded in prejudgment. If someone questions or criticizes our family, religion, or nation we usually feel personally attacked and rush to the defense. Once they become part of our personal and social identity, prejudices are hard to admit and even harder to dislodge.

An uncritical national perspective is often acquired in childhood, transmitted by parents, peers, and the media. Piaget noticed this tendency and commented, "... everything suggests that, on discovering the values accepted in his immediate circle, the child felt bound to accept the circle's opinions of

other national groups". These acquired images of other countries are typically not as favorable as that of one's own country, and are sometimes extremely negative. An us/them dichotomy results, one typically carried into adulthood as a network of prejudgments. We do not see beliefs based on these prejudgments as one possible perspective among many, but as the unquestionable truth. Without realizing it, we seek to confirm our prejudgments and tend to ignore what disconfirms them. We pay attention to what is negative about them and positive about us. Several things follow from this.

First, we rarely see in those people and groups we dislike the positive characteristics we take ourselves to have. Second, we rarely see in ourselves and our favored friends the faults we identify in groups we dislike. And third, we ascribe to ourselves and our friends intentions we withhold from those we dislike.

Consider the first of these drives as illustrated in beliefs concerning economic and political arrangements. Western style "free enterprise" and "democracy" are presented to the ordinary citizen as unquestionably and obviously the best choice among economic and political structures. Most North Americans could not persuasively argue for them, but are emotionally attached to these beliefs regardless. In short, most Westerners are deeply prejudiced in favor of their own economic and political arrangements and prejudiced against those that differ from their own. Any study of these systems, say, in school, occurs within this framework and carefully protects the favored prejudgments. Students do not learn the merits of other systems, but continually compare them invidiously to their own beliefs, and confirm their judgments as a result. Furthermore, we typically compare other systems' worse points with our systems' best points, negative facts about other systems with positive ideals within ours. This is routinely done with virtually no objection from the academic community, which itself usually reflects social prejudices. These tendencies, unrecognized and unchecked, embed our deeply held prejudgments in thought and action.

Prejudice also protects our viewpoints, interests, actions, and institutions from unsettling criticism. As mentioned previously, these beliefs often constitute the bulwark of our personal and cultural identity, and we often find it psychologically painful to think we might be wrong, especially regarding fundamentals. Prejudice gives us peace of mind, protects us from the possibility of having to admit fundamental error, allows us to pursue vested interests, and when others are harmed in some way by our pursuit of our interests, enables us to continue with a clear conscience. We need only search our own memories to find abundant examples of times we dogmatically defended some favored position or belief, only to change our minds later. Our egocentric and sociocentric thinking prevents us from considering the merits of other positions. Our rigid idealization of ourselves generates a rigid negation of those who question us, oppose us, or simply stand in our way.

In addition, prejudice offers a confident and comforting retreat from the complexities and uncertainties of life, for problems are more easily identified

and solutions more readily proposed, since there are few grey areas or complexities in prejudice. But the protection and solace of this retreat also provides for the flourishing of dogmatism, closedmindedness, double standards, oversimplification, injustice, and inequity. No one political or social system has all of the truth, neither does any political or social system contain all falsehood. But a dichotomous world view, acquired and preserved through prejudice, prevents recognition of whatever merit there might be in opposing systems. Honest and open dialogue among an array of different and opposing points of view is rare and its absence rarely noted.

Prejudice, again, is the typical, the normal state of affairs in everyday life, not an aberration; it serves a multitude of functions, from providing peace of mind to the gaining of power, wealth, and status; prejudice "for" a position is as common and potentially destructive as prejudice "against"; it is commonly directed against beliefs and ideologies as well as against ethnic and racial groups. It is one with the problem of human irrationality. National prejudice reflects this complexity. An examination of how the news media reinforces national prejudice suggests the kind of ambitious and thorough approach to prejudice reduction necessary to significantly lessen it.

◆ *Prejudice and the Mainstream* *U.S. World View*

One must first become aware of how a prejudice is expressed before one can recognize instances of it. Consider some of the more basic mainstream U.S. national prejudices.

We see ourselves as citizens of the most powerful country in the world. We see our country as moderate, peace-loving, just, democratic, free, honest in international dealings, supportive of human rights and consistently opposed to terrorism. Though subject to mistakes, the U.S. is seen as right on all fundamental issues, even when it stands alone against world opinion. Internally the country is understood to be the freest, with the greatest degree of equality of opportunity to rise to the top.

These are only a few of the many possible attitudes that could have been listed, attitudes that influence the way we view our country and its actions and policies. Since we assume that we are peace-loving, we have difficulty conceiving of our country as an aggressor in any conflict. Any who so conceive us fail to see that we are acting in self-defense, protecting ourselves, our allies, or our legitimate interests. We only "intervene" in the affairs of other countries to help them toward a more democratic government, even if they do not appreciate it at the time. We are criticized only because we are misunderstood, or because leftist propaganda has generated the criticism. Even when virtually every country of the world is against us (for example, in denying Arafat a visa) it is simply because they do not understand (in this case, because they do not grasp the threat of terrorism).

NEWS MEDIA AND NATIONAL PREJUDICE

All human thinking depends on our beliefs, beliefs that form the basis of classification, interpretation, and experience. Many of these beliefs are uncritically formed at an early age and retained and defended as prejudices. We rarely recognize how we acquired them or how they influence our perceptions. We experience but do not monitor *how* we experience events, nor do we identify what beliefs underlie which interpretations. As beliefs differ, expectations and interpretations also differ, but we do not observe this process in operation. For example, when citizens are raised to believe that the motives of their leaders are "pure" while the motives of leaders of "enemy" countries are "evil" or self-serving, events concerning these countries are experienced accordingly. The experiencer does not notice why, or link that experience to social conditioning. This difference in perspective focuses the attention of the viewer on some elements of the event and away from others, and often leads to widely disparate interpretations and experiences. News items about an intervention in *our* newspapers present interpretations of events based upon *our* assumptions and beliefs, while *their* newspapers present interpretations of the events based upon *their* assumptions and beliefs. We (and they) do not recognize that we both shape the news in a self-serving sociocentric way.

National prejudice is by no means peculiar to the United States. Every nation has its prejudiced image of itself as a nation, an image that greatly determines how events are interpreted. Consider this point made by Jerome Frank (1982), which vividly illustrates how national prejudice influences our image of other nations:

Enemy-images mirror each other — that is, each side attributes the same virtues to itself and the same vices to the enemy. "We" are trustworthy, peace-loving, honorable, and humanitarian, "they" are treacherous, warlike, and cruel. In surveys of Americans conducted in 1942, the first five adjectives chosen to characterize both Germans and Japanese (enemies) included warlike, treacherous, and cruel, none of which appeared among the first five describing the Russians (allies); in 1966 all three had disappeared from American characterizations of the Germans and Japanese (allies), but now the Russians (no longer allies, but more rivals than enemies) were warlike and treacherous. In 1966 the Mainland Chinese predictably, were seen as warlike, treacherous, and sly. After President Nixon's visit to China, these adjectives disappeared from our characterizations of the Chinese, whom we now see as hardworking, intelligent, artistic, progressive, and practical.

Several examples illustrate how these tendencies are articulated in the media. Consider Admiral Trost's article "The Morning of the Empty Trenches: Soviet Politics of Maneuver and the U.S. Response".

We in the West, whose ethical foundations lie on concepts of truth and justice, are frequently surprised to find that other civilizations have different ethics. In our relationship with the Soviet Union, this has had a curious inside-out effect. We have been lied to so many times that we now eagerly rush forward at the first sign that the Soviets are telling the truth. Occasionally, the Soviets may find it convenient to lie, and we must learn to deal with this.

Admiral Trost claims that the professed ethical foundations of some civilizations lie on falsehood and injustice. Clearly this is false, for all nations claim to value truth and justice. However, what a nation considers ethical often differs from what is actually ethical. Motivated by egocentricity and sociocentricity, people idealize their beliefs and actions. We value truth and justice, but so do they. We see our actions as good and just, but so do they. We differ, of course, in the things we take as being true and just.

If we or those we like engage in some activity of a questionable or negative nature, we justify the activity by appealing to motive or intent ("We meant well."). A clear example from the *San Francisco Chronicle* (1988) illustrates this:

For the United States the war in Vietnam was humbling, draining public hubris and setting the precedent for a deficit economy. Vietnam, with Soviet support, taught America that *purity of motive* does not always prevail. (Emphasis ours.)

Though most now agree that the war in Vietnam was a tragic mistake, many still insist that our motives were "pure". Several years ago the California State Assembly passed a resolution by a vote of 52-0, that the Vietnam war was waged for a "noble purpose". However, if those we dislike engage in similar actions, we ascribe negative intent to them as easily as we do positive intent to ourselves. The Soviet involvement in Afghanistan is a recent case in point. We see *ourselves* as intervening to support a struggling democracy (South Vietnam) against an outside aggressor (North Vietnam). We see *them* as invading Afghanistan to prop up a puppet dictatorship. The Soviets see these two instances as reversed: the U.S. is the aggressor, the U.S.S.R. is the liberator. To substantiate this, consider this excerpt from the Soviet press, taken from the front page of *Pravda* dated October 14, 1986. It is written in the form of an open letter to Soviet troops returning from Afghanistan. The headline reads: "To the Soldier Internationalists Returning from the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan".

Dear Comrades!

We welcome you warmly, glorious sons of the Homeland. You are returning home having honorably fulfilled your internationalist duty on the soil of friendly Afghanistan.

At the request of that country's legitimate government, you, soldiers of peace, along with your fighting friends who previously completed their terms of military service in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, have helped the Afghan people defend their independence and freedom and the achievements of the national democratic April Revolution, and have helped to ensure the reliable security of the southern borders of our Fatherland.

Soviet soldiers, along with Afghan soldiers and all of the country's patriots, have courageously opposed and continue to oppose the armed aggression of hostile forces encroaching on the sovereignty of the Afghan state.

The letter continues at some length, and includes such phrases as these: "... we take pride (in) freedom and equality, culture and democracy ..." and,

"Lasting peace and reliable security for all people is our ideal." Notice the elements common to the prejudice of many nations: the (stated) love of peace, democracy, equality; disdain for aggression, terrorism, imperialism, and oppression. We defend our interventionist activities in Central America by saying that we must protect this hemisphere from the encroachment of communist influence. The U.S.S.R. defends its interventionist activities in Afghanistan similarly:

(In a situation where imperialism continues to threaten the security of the socialist Fatherland and of our allies and friends and unceremoniously interferes in the affairs of others, we must be on guard.

The next two articles illustrate the use of a double standard to condemn the actions of an "enemy" country while not condemning similar actions of a "friendly" country. Both articles appeared on the front page of the "World News" section of the March 1, 1989, edition of the *San Francisco Chronicle*. The first article is titled "No Attacks on Israel: U.S. Amends Terms For Talks With PLO".

The United States called on the Palestine Liberation Organization yesterday to refrain from attacks on Israeli military and civilian targets inside and outside Israel if it wants to continue its discussions with Washington

In December, the United States agreed to open direct talks with the PLO after Yasser Arafat ... renounced terrorism and said he accepts Israel's right to exist.

Now the United States is saying that the PLO must abstain from attacks on Israeli military targets regardless of whether such attacks fit its definition of terrorism.

In contrasting this article with the one appearing with it, the double standard becomes immediately apparent. The article is headlined "Israeli Jets Hit Bases in Lebanon 22 Children Hurt".

Israeli jets bombed Palestinian targets southwest of Beirut yesterday, killing three people and wounding 22 school children, the police said. The police said a missile fired by one of the jets hit a school yard in the village of Ainab, wounding the children.

Nothing in this article suggests that Israel be censured for this attack. Neither is any connection made between the bombing of school yards and 'terrorism'. To exercise fairmindedness, we should imagine how this event would have been reported had Palestine attacked Israel and injured 22 Israeli school children. The action would certainly have been labeled terrorism and condemned. Instead, we condemn Palestine and declare that "the PLO must abstain from attacks on Israeli military targets," while Israel is free to "defend" its interests however it likes. Two standards are applied, a very liberal one for our ally, a strict one for their adversary.

Consider another article from the front page of *Pravda*, April 2, 1988.

Occupied Territories: Despite the draconian repressive measures of the occupational authorities, Palestinians took to the streets in the past 24 hours to express protest against the terror unleashed on them by the aggressors. A

UN spokesman stated that on Wednesday, Land Day, the Israeli aggressors killed eight people and wounded 250 in carrying out punitive actions against the Palestinians.

We are immediately struck by several words: repressive, terror, aggressors, and punitive actions. These are words U.S. citizens normally associate with the Palestinians and their actions, not the Israelis and their actions. This article would be written very differently in our press, written to favor our friend and ally, Israel. Sociocentricity inevitably convinces us that our actions and our ally's actions are justified. This attitude is reflected in and perpetuated by the language we use to describe these events. Our choice of words give important clues in identifying prejudice: the favorable words reserved for our friends, the negative for our rivals or enemies.

Of the many forms that prejudice can take, national prejudice has perhaps the greatest potential for destruction. The prejudices of nations have global consequences. The deep-seated problems of environmental change, new complex health problems, worsening human relations, diminishing resources, overpopulation, rising expectations, global competition, and ideological conflict increasingly interact with each other to produce a host of multidimensional, logically messy problems. Our survival as a species demands that the higher potential of human critical thought be significantly tapped. The ability to recognize national prejudice and prejudiced thinking requires cultivation, as do the more general principles of critical thought.

◆ Conclusion

Prejudice is a rich, complex, multidimensional phenomenon, grounded in what might be called the primary, instinctual nature of human thinking. Removing prejudice requires the development of our secondary, more latent, nature, our capacity to develop as fairminded rational persons. Research into prejudice has truncated the concept while underestimating its roots, thereby delaying deep understanding of the global nature of the problem as well as of the required solution.

To understand the nature of prejudice, we must see it in relation to our basic modes of thinking, in relation to our desires and goals, in relation to our intellectual and moral traits of mind, in relation to our social groups and educational practices. Prejudice formation involves the way we think, the way we form beliefs, and the way we assess beliefs. It is fundamentally uncritical or narrowmindedly critical, governed by egocentricity and sociocentricity, reflecting double standards and inconsistencies. Obviously, humans *can* analyze, synthesize, and assess their thinking in a less than fairminded way. They can easily reshape their thinking to make it self-delusive. They create fantasies that have little relationship to reality and then live in them as though they were reality. They confuse their systems of thought, their viewpoints, ideologies, and cultural perspectives with reality

itself. They embody their prejudices in cultural practices, indoctrinate children into narrow and rigid beliefs, and perpetuate closedmindedness, intolerance, and fear. They easily say one thing and do another, compartmentalize their contradictions, believe what their experience denies, ignore evidence, misuse language, value in themselves what they criticize in others, ignore and repeat their mistakes, project their faults onto others, and undermine the conditions of their own survival.

Fairminded critical thinking has always been a part of human thinking, but typically a subordinate part. Intellectuals and other intelligent people often use prejudiced thinking to advance their self-interest. Rather than exposing the narrowness of ideologies, they distinguish themselves as skilled proponents of them; rather than challenging prejudices and risking the wrath of the prejudiced, they perpetuate them; rather than taking on the worthwhile task of helping people become independent thinkers, they manipulate them, thereby advancing their self-interest. It is certainly easier to *take advantage of* prejudices and narrowmindedness than to *eradicate* them. As a result, human life and societies have often been dominated by the manipulated and the manipulators, by those largely uncritical in their thought and action and those who use their critical abilities to their narrowly conceived personal advantage. This weak form of critical thinking is the predominant mode of critical thinking developed in schools and social life.

Because the problem of prejudice formation and preservation reflects fundamental forms of thought that pervade every dimension of social and personal life, any successful effort to reduce prejudice must be systematic and foundational. A sustained and serious effort to reduce prejudice should extend into three areas of a child's life: the scholastic, the familial, and the social. Of these three, the scholastic provides the most immediate opportunity for implementing a comprehensive program of prejudice reduction. But this cannot be accomplished quickly, nor should we expect it to be. To effect changes as fundamental and sweeping as these will take years. This is an argument, not against action, but rather for a realistic strategy, for steady, deep changes over a long time. As individuals change, as their mode of thinking shifts from one that encourages prejudiced thought formation to one antithetical to it, society's folkways and mores will themselves shift, and so will familial behavior and interaction.

An educational effort to move students from prejudiced to fairminded thought processes requires critical thinking and the cultivation of intellectual traits of character. (Paul, 1987c, 1988a, 1988b.) It should not focus on the content of particular prejudices except for illustrative purposes. It should emphasize the explication of the *mechanisms* of prejudice and their role in the struggle for power, advantage, and money. It should begin with the assumption that prejudice recognition and reduction ought to begin with each of us, with our own prejudices. A credible program of prejudice reduction ought not focus on the prejudices of others, prejudices against us, for we are ideally situated to change our own mode of thinking, not to change the thinking of others.

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